October 18, 2013 After correctly acknowledging the possibility of reformation as a ground to commute the death sentence, the Supreme Court must now consider the case of 22 individuals awaiting execution in the same vein Three judges of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice of India, have come to the conclusion that Sushil Sharma does not deserve the death penalty for murdering his wife, Naina Sahni, and trying to dispose of her body by burning it in a tandoor. It is no secret that India’s death penalty jurisprudence, at all levels of the judiciary, is in a shambles and the reasoning adopted in Sushil Sharma’s judgment raises very serious concerns about the justice that has been meted out to 22 individuals on the verge of execution after their mercy petitions were rejected by the President (four of them by Pratibha Patil and 18 by Pranab Mukherjee). While a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear the pleas of 18 of the 22 individuals only on the issue of delay caused by the State in deciding their mercy petition, the issue that I want to explore in the context of the Sushil Sharma case is the manner in which they were sentenced to death.
In terms of the law, not all
murders, terrorist acts, rapes and murders, acts of treason, etc attract the
death penalty. The “rarest of the rare” doctrine was introduced in Bachan Singh
to lend some coherence to instances in which the death penalty might be justified
by balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, the “rarest of
the rare” doctrine has evolved into one of the most misunderstood and
misapplied doctrines not just in public discourse but even in judicial
pronouncements from courts at all levels. The “rarest of the rare” doctrine is
often misunderstood as referring only to the heinousness of the crime. The
focus is equally meant to be on the mitigating circumstances of the person
including whether it has been decidedly shown that she is beyond reformation.
REASONS FOR COMMUTATION
The Court seems to have placed
significant weight on the point that the State had not led any evidence to show
that Sushil Sharma was beyond reformation. These are very important moves by
the Court as it is a clear attempt to move away from multiple judgments in the
past where the focus was only on the brutal nature of the crime. This is an
important step in the inevitable course correction that the Supreme Court will
have to undertake on the manner in which it examines aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in death penalty cases. By taking the position that the State,
while demanding the death penalty, should demonstrate that the individual will
revert to such crimes, the Court has brought the focus back on the mitigating
circumstances and the appropriate burden on the State. It is this aspect of
reformation that was articulated in Bachan Singh that has been ignored most
often and the obligation is most certainly on the State to show the
impossibility of reformation. It is of course not the position in Bachan Singh
that any one factor can trump all others and Courts are meant to balance
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Reformation is an issue that is
relevant to all prisoners who appear before the Court irrespective of the
nature of the crime, age, sex and social background. If judges want to balance
away the interests of reformation in favour of other factors, Courts must be
left free to do so. However, there must be an obligation and culture of justification
as far as reformation of the death row convict is concerned. As judges seal the
fate of the convict, the least they must do is explain the evidence presented
before them that led to the conclusion that the convict could not be reformed.
If no such evidence is presented before the Court, there must be a presumption
of reformation and judges must meet a high threshold of justification if they
want to override that presumption. A disingenuous strategy adopted in many
judgments confirming the death penalty has been to cite the brutality of the
crime as indicative of the impossibility of reformation. To argue that an
individual cannot be reformed because of the crime she has committed is a
perverse articulation of what was intended in Bachan Singh.
BEYOND REFORMATION? Sushil Sharma
has certainly benefited from the substantial weight assigned to reformation as
envisaged in Bachan Singh. But the 22 individuals who stand on the verge of
execution have not had the benefit of such enquiry into the possibility of
their reformation. Apart from highlighting the brutality of the crime, in none
of their cases did the State lead any evidence on reformation and unlike in
Sushil Sharma’s case, neither did any judge ask the State why it had not
presented any such evidence. We must have no illusion that we have brought
these 22 individuals extremely close to their death without any court of law in
this country having paid adequate attention to the possibility of their
reformation.
DOUBLE INJUSTICE
Almost all of
these 22 individuals have spent a very long time in prison and it reflects the
lack of humanity in our legal system that we have no mechanism to evaluate the
changes they have undergone. The most tragic aspect of death sentences in India
is that we often have an image of the prisoner that is frozen in time. It is an
image of her when she committed the crime and our moral judgment of the person
at that point of time is all that seems to matter. There is no place in our
public and legal imagination for the effects of long periods of incarceration.
Some of them are the most trusted prisoners in the jails in which they are
lodged, some others contribute to the administration of the jail by maintaining
records and teaching other prisoners about work they could do in jail, some
others have picked up skills and earned degrees while simultaneously having
introspected about their time in jail.
Of course it is not just about
the good things. Incarceration and differing levels of alienation from their
families have left many of them extremely mentally vulnerable, displaying signs
of severe depression and psychosis. In that sense, these 22 individuals have
suffered a double injustice. Neither was the possibility of their reformation
explored at the time of sentencing them to death nor is the system interested
in evaluating them as individuals as they are today. It would be unconscionable
to hang any of these 22 individuals without considering the issue of
reformation meaningfully. Otherwise, it starts to look like there is one standard
of justice for people like Sushil Sharma and quite another standard when it
comes to Shivu, Jadeswamy, Maganlal, Jafar Ali, Gurmeet Singh, Suresh, Ramji,
Perarivalan, Murugan, Santhan, Saibanna, Simon, Madaiah, Gynanaprakasan,
Bilavendra, Dharampal, Sonia, Sanjeev, Praveen Kumar, Bhullar, Umesh and Sundar
Singh.
(Anup Surendranath is the
director of the Death Penalty Research Project at the National Law University,
Delhi.)
Source:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/on-the-verge-of-unconscionable-hangings/article5244610.ece
[last accessed on 04.03.2015]
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