Saturday, August 30, 2025

Karnataka couple sentenced to death for 2016 murder

Curated By :Anushka Vats
August 30, 2025, 18:30 IST

Krishnamurthy’s brother, Shivaraju, later helped transport the body in an Innova car to dump it in the Bhadra River. All three accused were convicted this year.



Back in 2005, government teachers Imtiyaz Ahmed and Lakshmi fell in love at a primary school in Kalaburagi. Despite being an interfaith couple, they married in 2011 with no objections from their families and were blessed with a son. The love story, however, met a brutal end, shattered by Lakshmi’s extramarital affair and a calculated murder plot.

The Love Story And The Marriage

The couple tied the knot in 2011. Despite it being an interfaith marriage, their families had no objections. However, in 2014, Lakshmi’s mother got sick and she had to move to Bhadravati to care for her. During this separation, she reconnected with her childhood friend, Krishnamurthy, and their friendship turned into an affair, reported the Indian Express.

Imtiyaz Discovers Affair

Imtiyaz’s transfer at first was put on hold; however, he got a transfer in 2016 and moved to Bhadravati, where he discovered about his wife’s affair. The family warned Krishnamurthy to stay away, but the two lovers had already hatched a plot.

The Murder Plot

On July 7, 2016, they executed their plan. After lacing Imtiyaz’s dinner with sedatives, Lakshmi and Krishnamurthy bludgeoned him to death with an iron pipe and a hammer. Krishnamurthy’s brother, Shivaraju, later helped transport the body in an Innova car to dump it in the Bhadra River. However, Lakshmi got scared and called Imtiyaz’s brother, Ejaz Ahmed, confessing to the crime. According to a police officer quoted by the Indian Express, “Lakshmi told him that she killed Imtiyaz as he beat her up and harassed her every day. She sought his protection and support in the interest of her child’s future, and pleaded with him not to reveal the matter to anyone." However, Ejaz alerted the police about the crime.

The new station inspector, TK Chandrashekar, acted swiftly. “Lakshmi claimed that she killed her husband, but we did not have the body, nor the accused," he said. Police tracked her phone location and arrested her and Krishnamurthy as they attempted to flee. Their WhatsApp chats, with 201 messages detailing the plan from June 30 to July 8, proved the murder was premeditated. With the help of expert swimmers, Imtiyaz’s body was recovered on July 9; the injuries matched the seized weapons.

The Judgement

In a landmark judgment for Bhadravati, the court convicted all three in August of this year. Lakshmi and Krishnamurthy were sentenced to death, while Shivaraju received seven years in prison. The court also ordered Rs 10 lakh in compensation for Imtiyaz’s family. In her ruling, Judge Indira Mailswamy Chettiyar said, “Teachers are those who shape lives… But the accused 1 (Lakshmi) has maligned the image of the profession by killing her husband mercilessly. She was an educated woman, and if she did not want to live with her husband, she could have taken a divorce through the court. But she chose to kill him, which cannot be pardoned," reported the Indian Express.
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Source: https://www.news18.com/india/how-an-anxious-phone-call-after-murder-unraveled-teachers-plot-to-kill-husband-9538651.html

Friday, August 29, 2025

Mysuru Man Sentenced to Death for Wife’s Murder (Summary)

TNN / Aug 29, 2025


A Mysuru district court has sentenced Mahesh to death for the brutal killing of his wife, Shilpa (26). The incident occurred on April 14, 2024, when Mahesh attacked Shilpa with a sickle, striking her 21 times as she was getting off a bus.

According to the prosecution, Mahesh, who was addicted to gambling and in heavy debt, had pressured his wife to sign over land papers, leading to the fatal attack. The court convicted him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed a fine of ₹1 lakh. The trial was completed in about 15 months, but the death sentence must still be confirmed by the Karnataka High Court before it can be carried out.

Source: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mysuru/mys-court-awards-death-sentence-to-man-for-brutally-killing-wife/articleshow/123589414.cms

Thursday, August 28, 2025

“Classic example of lackluster and shabby investigation”; Supreme Court acquits two men, including death row convict, in 12-year-old’s rape and murder case

Published on August 28, 2025By Apoorva...

“We feel that the present case is yet another classic example of lackluster and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure which has led to the failure of a case involving brutal rape and murder of an innocent girl child.” ...

Supreme Court: In an appeal filed against the 2018 judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which had upheld the convictions of two individuals, sentencing one to death and the other to life imprisonment for the rape and murder of a 12-year-old girl in Lucknow in 2012, a three-judge bench of Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol, and Sandeep Mehta*, JJ. acquitted both the convicts.

Justice Sandeep Mehta

The Court came down heavily on the police and prosecution, attributing the failure of the case to a glaringly shoddy investigation and a lackadaisical trial process. It found that the case was damaged by serious procedural lapses, including the failure to prove the chain of custody of forensic samples, contradictory and unreliable witness testimonies, and the prosecution’s inability to eliminate the possibility of others committing the crime. Emphasising the settled principle that conviction in a case based solely on circumstantial evidence requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court held that the evidence presented fell far short of that standard. Consequently, both convicts were acquitted and ordered to be released from custody.

Background

The incident occurred in September 2012, when a 12-year-old girl went missing after going out to attend to nature’s call. Despite efforts by her family members and villagers to locate her throughout the night, she remained untraceable. The following morning, her blood-stained underclothes, footwear, and a water container were found in a field cultivated by Convict No.1. Shortly thereafter, her naked body was discovered lying in an adjacent agricultural field. A police complaint was lodged immediately, and a First Information Report (‘FIR’) was registered under Sections 302, 201 and 376 of the IPC. The investigation, led by Sub-Inspector, resulted in the seizure of various incriminating articles, including bloodstained soil, clothes, and a male comb. The sniffer dog squad traced the scent from the comb to the house of convict 2. The postmortem, conducted by a medical board confirmed sexual assault and death due to asphyxia by strangulation, with nine ante-mortem injuries. Upon conclusion of the trial, vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by Additional Sessions Judge (‘Trial Court’) the convicts were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(g), 201 and 302 of Penal Code, 1860, The Trial Court made a reference to the Allahabad High Court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to convict 1. The convicts also filed separate appeals challenging their convictions and sentences. The High Court, by judgment dated 11-10-2018, confirmed the death sentence of convict 1 and dismissed the appeals preferred by the convicts. This judgment is now under challenge in the present appeal.

Analysis and Decision

The Court examined the testimonies of the father of the child victim, and her mother, in the context of the alleged involvement of convict 1. The father deposed that his daughter had informed her mother and gone out around 7:00 PM to relieve herself, following which she did not return. While the family launched a search, he made no mention of any dog squad involvement, nor did he state that the underwear of the child was found in the field cultivated by the convict, although the Investigating Officer later claimed such recovery. Moreover, none of the incriminating articles allegedly recovered. The only act attributed to the convict by the father was based on a witness statement that she saw convict 1 washing his hands and face and entering his house during the search. The Court noted that this conduct, on its own, was not unusual for a person returning from agricultural work and could not be treated as incriminating. The mother of the child victim, in her deposition, echoed similar facts and added that convict 1 later changed his clothes and left on his bicycle, without enquiring into the ongoing commotion. The Trial and High Court had considered this indifference as incriminating. However, the Court found this behaviour to be neutral, noting that mere absence of concern or non-enquiry does not, in isolation, amount to incriminating conduct. Her claim that convict 1 looked disgruntled and left in a hurry was also considered an improvement from her earlier statement under Section 161 CrPC and not enough to establish guilt. The Court concluded that the conduct of convict 1, such as washing up, entering his own house, or even leaving without making inquiries, was not unnatural and could not, by itself, give rise to a presumption of guilt.

The prosecution’s claim against convict 2 hinged on the recovery of a plastic comb allegedly belonging to him, found at the crime scene. The sniffer dog, upon sniffing the comb, purportedly led the police to his house. However, the Court found this entire sequence of events riddled with inconsistencies and lacking credibility, for the following reasons:

  1. Multiple prosecution witnesses gave conflicting descriptions of the comb’s colour. These discrepancies rendered the identity and recovery of the comb doubtful.
  2. The prosecution’s claim that the witnesses had seen convict 2 using the comb and could identify it as his was deemed farfetched and implausible. The Court observed that the comb was a common, mass-produced plastic item, lacking any distinctive features. As such, the assertion that it specifically belonged to convict 2 was not believable.
  3. The Court noted that no official record or documentation was prepared regarding the dog squad operation that allegedly linked the comb to convict 2’s residence.

In conclusion, the Court held that the prosecution’s attempt to link convict 2 to the crime through the recovery of the comb and sniffer dog evidence was contrived and unreliable. The evidence was not worthy of credence and appeared to be an attempt to falsely implicate the accused.

Crucial flaws in prosecution’s case rendering DNA reports inadmissible

1. No Proof of Blood Sample Collection:
  • The prosecution failed to prove the procedure, date, or time of collecting the blood samples of the convicts for DNA testing.
  • No oral or documentary evidence was produced to establish how or when the samples were drawn.
  • There was a complete lack of chain of custody evidence for the blood samples. 

2. Contradictions in Medical Testimony:
  • Inconsistency between two medical jurists: This discrepancy raised serious doubt about the reliability and authenticity of the samples used for DNA testing. 
3. No Proof of Sample Preservation and Forwarding: 
  • No witness was examined to establish the chain of custody, from seizure, preservation, to forwarding to the Forensic Science Lab (FSL). 
  • No documentation was provided to prove the safe handling and transfer of samples.
4. Failure to Examine Key Officials: 

The custodian of seized materials was not examined. 

The officials who transported the samples to the FSL were also not produced as witnesses.

5. No Documentation of Sample Transmission:
  • Not a single document proving the transmission of samples to the FSL was exhibited.
  • The primary DNA report was deemed inconclusive and thus inadmissible in evidence.

The Court found that the conclusions drawn in the first DNA report and the supplementary DNA report were in stark contradiction to each other. Despite this, the prosecution failed to summon the expert concerned to reconcile the discrepancy. As a result, the Court held that the prosecution could not be permitted to rely on the supplementary DNA report to the prejudice of the accused. This failure to clarify conflicting scientific evidence significantly weakened the evidentiary value of DNA reports. Furthermore, the Court noted that although the material objects, including the clothes of the deceased child victim, were exhibited through the testimony of the investigating officer, they were never shown to the parents for identification during their deposition in court. This raised serious doubts as to whether the recovered articles actually belonged to the victim. To compound this deficiency, the prosecution offered no explanation for its failure to send the child’s clothes to FSL for examination. In a case involving grave charges, such a lapse in conducting basic forensic procedures was found to be a significant flaw in the investigation, further diminishing the credibility of the prosecution’s case.

The Court emphasised that even if it were assumed that certain material objects were indeed recovered from the field under the cultivation of convict 1, such recovery alone could not be treated as an incriminating circumstance strong enough to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must bridge the gap between “may be proved” and “must be proved” before securing a conviction. The Court highlighted that the fields where the child victim’s body and personal belongings were found were open and accessible to the public, meaning that anyone could have committed the crime. Therefore, the prosecution had a duty to eliminate all other possible hypotheses, including the involvement of persons other than the convicts.

The Court noted that although the child’s dead body was discovered in the field, and her chappals, water canister, and underwear were allegedly recovered from the field of convict 1, such facts might raise suspicion. However, suspicion, no matter how strong, could not substitute for proof. Without clear, cogent, and complete evidence ruling out the involvement of others, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to meet the legal standard required to hold the accused guilty. The Court further noted that the testimony of the victim’s mother, claiming to have seen convict 1 washing his face and changing clothes after the incident, could not be treated as an incriminating circumstance. The Court found this version to be exaggerated, especially since it was not mentioned in the original complaint filed by her husband, Moreover, if there were any truth to this allegation, the investigating officers would have likely conducted a thorough search of the accused’s house to find evidence, but no such effort was made. This failure further discredited the reliability of the prosecution’s case and raised doubts about the conduct of the investigation.

The Court described the investigation as lackluster and poorly handled, particularly in a case involving the heinous rape and murder of a 12-year-old girl. It criticized the failure of the investigating officers to examine any witnesses from neighboring fields where the body was discovered, despite the fact that the incident occurred at a time when there would have been people in the vicinity. Their failure to speak to anyone from the area further cast doubt on the prosecution’s case. The Court reiterated that no documents were produced regarding the collection of the convict’s blood samples, rendering the DNA reports inadmissible. It emphasised that the supplementary DNA report was introduced during the appeal process through an affidavit by an officer who had no connection with the report itself. Since the DNA report is a substantive piece of evidence, it could not have been introduced through an affidavit, particularly under Section 293 of the CrPC, which allows affidavits only for formal evidence.

The Court reaffirmed that in a case based solely on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must point exclusively to the guilt of the accused and must rule out any other possibility. After thoroughly analysing the record, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to meet this standard. Therefore, the convicts were acquitted and ordered to be released from custody immediately if not wanted in any other case. The judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court were quashed and set aside, and any pending applications were disposed of.

[Putai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No(s). 36-37 of 2019, decided on 26-08-2025] 

*Judgment Authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta

Advocates who appeared in this case: For Appellant(s): Mr. Sadan Farasat, Sr. Adv. Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Adv. Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Babbar, Adv. Mr. Kabir Dixit, AOR Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, AOR

For Respondent(s): Mr. Shaurya Sahay, AOR Mr. Aditya Kumar, Adv. Mr. Aman Jaiswal, Adv...

Source: 

Kolkata - High Court commutes death sentence in double murder case, acquits co-accused

By Soumyadip Mullick

28 Aug 2025

Kolkata: The Calcutta High Court on Wednesday upheld the conviction of Md. Jahangir Sahaji for murdering his wife and minor son but commuted the death sentence awarded to him by a Barasat court to life imprisonment. A division bench of Justices Debangsu Basak and Prasenjit Biswas also acquitted co-accused Rowsanara Bibi, mother-in-law of the deceased woman, citing lack of evidence. The case arose from the deaths of Sanjura Bibi, Jahangir’s second wife, and Imran Sahaji, his six-year-old son from a previous marriage, who sustained fatal burn injuries inside Jahangir’s residence at Ashoknagar, North 24 Parganas, in March 2006, just 19 days after his marriage. According to the prosecution, Jahangir had demanded Rs. 20,000 as dowry and subjected Sanjura to physical assault, a fact she reported to her father Abdul Sattar and a relative. On the night of the incident, neighbours discovered the victims with burn injuries in a closed room reeking of kerosene, alongside an empty barrel. Jahangir, who had suffered minor burns, emerged from the house but fled; he was later admitted to hospital.

Justices Debangsu Basak

The High Court noted that the deaths occurred in secrecy within the matrimonial home, where Jahangir was present. Once such foundational facts were established, the burden lay on him under the Evidence Act to explain the circumstances, the bench observed. His failure to do so, coupled with the medical evidence of ante-mortem burns, selective burning confined to the bed, and absence of any suicide implements, pointed towards homicidal death. Rejecting the defence argument of accidental or suicidal fire, the judges stressed that the uniform burn injuries on both victims, including the sleeping child, ruled out self-infliction. Jahangir’s conduct in failing to rescue the victims or raise alarm further strengthened the prosecution case. As for Rowsanara, the court found no evidence linking her to the incident and set aside her conviction. On sentencing, the bench held that the case did not fall in the “rarest of rare” category warranting capital punishment. Jahangir’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, while his conviction for murder and cruelty was affirmed. The court directed that trial court records be returned and urgent certified copies of the judgment issued.

Whether Art. 32 of the Constitution empowers reconsideration of death sentence that has attained finality? Supreme Court answers

Published on August 28, 2025
By Sucheta...

In a significant decision, a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court explored the contours of Article 32 of the Constitution to answer whether death sentence which has attained finality, can be revisited at all?

Supreme Court: While considering this writ petition challenging the imposition of death sentence on the convict and seeking its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and judicial developments, particularly with reference to the guidelines laid down in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 353, the 3 Judge Bench of Vikram Nath*, Sanjay Karol** and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., held that Article 32 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court in cases related to capital punishment, to reopen the sentencing stage where the accused has been condemned to death penalty to ensure that the guidelines mandated in Manoj (supra) were followed. “This corrective power is invoked precisely to compel rigorous application of the Manoj (supra) safeguards in such cases, thereby ensuring that the condemned person is not deprived of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, individualized sentencing, and fair procedure that Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution secure to every person”. Vikram Nath, J., however cautioned that Article 32 of the is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters.

In his concurring opinion, Sanjay Karol, J., opined that judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a right was conferred upon the convict to have his death sentence re-examined in the light of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj (supra), and therefore to exercise such a right directly impacts the convict’s Article 21 rights, that a petition under Article 32 had to be preferred. It, therefore, must be necessarily held to be maintainable.

Background and Legal Trajectory

In the 2008, the convict lured a 4-year-old girl away from her home in Wadi, Nagpur, transported her to a secluded spot, thereafter, sexually assaulted and strangled her to death and then attempted to conceal the body among nearby shrubs. An FIR was registered on the same day. The convict was arrested, and a charge-sheet was filed for offences under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). In 2010 Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur charged the convict under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 IPC and imposed death sentence on him. During the original trial, the convict, who was unable to afford private counsel, was represented by legal aid counsel whose absence on crucial dates resulted in four material witnesses remaining un-cross-examined. Bombay High Court in 2011 set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that the convict had been denied an effective defence and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of cross-examining the said witnesses. Upon remand, the same legal-aid counsel represented the convict and four witnesses were cross-examined, but counsel was absent at the hearing on sentence. By judgment dated 23-02-2012, the convict’s charges and death sentence were re-imposed by the Trial Court, recording the convict’s age being around 45 years at the time of the incident and family dependants as mitigating circumstances. On 27-03-2012, the High Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The Supreme Court by judgment dated 26-11-2014 dismissed the convict’s appeal and confirmed the death sentence as the only mitigation circumstances placed at that time were related to the convict’s youth and the probability of reformation. The convict filed a review petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed. His mercy petitions under Articles 161 and 72 of the Constitution, were also rejected. The convict submitted that on 20-05-2022, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Manoj (supra), formulating practical, time-bound guidelines obliging Trial Courts and the State to place extensive mitigation circumstances on record including psychiatric, psychological, social-history and jail conduct reports. Furthermore, on 19-09-2022, a Constitution Bench reference was made in Death Sentence Mitigating Circumstances Guidelines, In re, (2023) 19 SCC 695, to evolve a uniform sentencing framework and to delineate modalities for psychological evaluation and collection of mitigating material, wherein the convict’s case was cited as illustrative of inconsistencies in existing practice. It was in this backdrop, that the convict approached the Supreme Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking reconsideration of the death sentence affirmed on 03-05-2017. Counsel for the convict contended that the death sentence was affirmed in 2017 without the benefit of the sentencing protocol subsequently mandated in Manoj (supra). It was submitted that the evolution of sentencing law in Manoj (supra) and the pending Constitution Bench reference in Death Sentence Mitigating Circumstances Guidelines, In re (supra), together constitute a “substantial change in law”. Applying the settled rule of beneficial construction, those developments must operate retrospectively in favour of a condemned prisoner whose sentence is yet to be executed. Meanwhile, counsels appearing for the respondents submitted that the convict’s petition under Article 32 is an impermissible attempt to reopen the Supreme Court’s judgment affirming conviction and death sentence, which had attained finality after dismissal of Review Petition and later rejection of mercy petitions by both the Governor and the President of India.

Issue Framed

Under Article 32 of the Constitution, whether Supreme Court may revisit a death sentence that stands concluded, having been affirmed on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy petitions, on the strength of the sentencing framework propounded in Manoj (supra).

Court’s Assessment

A. Justice Vikram Nath’s Opinion

Justice Vikram Nath

Perusing the facts of the case, contentions of the parties and issue framed, the Court noted that the issue so framed, revolves around the very maintainability of the petition. Taking note of the pending Constitution Bench reference in Death Sentence Mitigating Circumstances Guidelines, In re (supra) and reference to Central Government in Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 767, the Court emphasised that in the present petition, the Court’s task is confined to determining whether Article 32 of the Constitution itself empowers the Supreme Court to revisit a sentence that has attained finality. The Court perused the relevant paras in Manoj (supra) which laid the guidelines for collecting mitigating circumstances. The Court pointed out that a bare perusal of the guidelines reveals that Manoj (supra) sought to implement the reformative ideal underlying capital sentencing by replacing ad-hoc impressions of accused with verifiable data. The directions put obligation on the State, rather than the accused, to place before the Trial Court, at the very sentencing stage, a structured dossier covering psychiatric assessment proximate to the offence, socio-economic and family history, educational attainments, prior conduct, and a contemporaneous report on jail behaviour. These guidelines were laid down to serve as an interim, judicially crafted framework pending comprehensive legislative or executive action with respect to capital sentencing. The Court also pointed out that the present petition has invoked this power on a narrow but grave premise. Perusing the facts, the Court pointed out that although the conviction has long since become final, the State now proposes to end his life through a sentencing process that the convict claims, has ignored the safeguards later formalised in Manoj (Supra), thereby offending the twin guarantees of equality and due procedure embodied in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 

Deliberating over the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court pointed out that this Article is the “constitutional conduit through which this Court may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the enforcement of Fundamental Rights”. The Court stated that to determine Article 32’s scope, four principal lines of enquiry must be considered- 

  1. The settled place of Article 32 of the Constitution as a continuing safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to be carried out. 
  2. Court’s power and duty to set aside procedural finality when that course alone can avert a breach of the guarantees of equality and life. 
  3. To test whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj (supra) has assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard. 
  4. Delineate the form and extent of the corrective relief that may properly be fashioned under Article 32 of the Constitution, mindful that any order given must both protect constitutional rights and preserve the stability of adjudication. 
Considering the afore-stated lines of enquiry one by one, the Court explained that death-sentence cases stand apart because the punishment extinguishes the right to life in an irreversible way, and that singular feature obliges the Court to keep the door of constitutional review open even after the ordinary appellate and review avenues have closed. Article 32 of the Constitution, therefore, remains available whenever a supervening fact, such as inordinate delay, emergent mental illness, or a parity-based anomaly, or a subsequently recognised procedural guarantee throws the legitimacy of a capital sentence into doubt. 

“The power to intervene under Article 32 of the Constitution is meant to prevent the Constitution from being stymied by formal finality when a human life hangs in the balance”. 

Considering power to do complete justice notwithstanding procedural finality, the Court explained that the settled law of is that procedural finality cannot stand in the way of curing a constitutional wrong which implicates life or liberty. The Court noted that the convict’s grievance, namely, the absence of the procedural guarantees subsequently crystallised in Manoj (supra) and the emergence of new medical evidence, lies outside the curative ambit. Thus, the only efficacious avenue is the inherent corrective power recognised in A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, exercised through Article 32 of the Constitution and, where necessary, Article 142 of the Constitution, to fashion relief that vindicates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the formal finality of prior proceedings. 

On the question of procedural fairness in capital sentencing as an imperative under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the Court stated that right to be sentenced in a principled and individualized manner flows directly from Articles 14 and 21. It was pointed out that Manoj (supra) was delivered against the backdrop of persistent concerns highlighted in the 262nd Law Commission Report, about the inconsistency and inadequacy of death-penalty sentencing. This led to the devising of procedural architecture imposing various obligations on State to protect the Rights of the accused. “These requirements are not administrative niceties, but they exist to give substantive content to the constitutional mandate that punishment should be individually tailored and proportionate”. The Court observed that since Manoj (supra), an institutional practice has emerged whereby the Court routinely calls for the mandated reports before deciding appeals in capital punishment cases. Taking note of the suo-motu cognisance of the absence of a uniform trial-level framework in Death Sentence Mitigating Circumstances Guidelines, In re (supra), the Court concluded that Manoj (supra) protocol has become an indispensable component of a “meaningful, real and effective” sentencing hearing. The Court thus stated that, “In the present case, where the petitioner seeks only the enforcement of a procedural safeguard now recognised as integral to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and where no equally efficacious alternative remedy exists, the invocation of our extraordinary jurisdiction is both appropriate and justified”. On the question of plenary power to mould relief under Articles 32 and 142, the Court explained that the Court’s ability to grant effective relief is not exhausted by the formal confines of appellate review. Article 32 is not restricted to reviewing decisions of subordinate courts or executive authorities. In exceptional situations it empowers the Court to revisit even its own final orders where doing so is necessary to prevent a continuing breach of fundamental rights. 

B. Justice Sanjay Karol’s concurring opinion 

Justice Sanjay Karol, J. 

In his concurring opinion, Sanjay Karol, J., pointed out that the question that is to be considered is whether the rights under Article 21 of the present convict and the other similarly placed convicts, who would be benefitted by the retrospective application of Manoj (supra), would be harmed and their dignity threatened if this particular aspect is seen only from the angle of a subsequent development, as it would defeat the purpose of individualized sentencing put forth in Manoj (supra) and the mitigating factors that could possibly be brought on record by the present convict, will be left untouched and unexplored. Karol, J., opined that the Courts do not create new law but merely declare what the law has always been, so that any overruling by a subsequent decision, operates retrospectively. He explained that judicial declarations usually operate retrospectively, ensuring that the benefits of such rulings generally reach past cases unless specifically restricted. “This continuity in judicial philosophy upholds fairness by protecting individual rights regardless of the timing of the judgment”. He further pointed out that the law declared in Manoj (supra) has acquired such a status that the non-availability thereof to the convict prejudices him greatly. Karol, J., pointed out that in the present case, where conviction has been confirmed, and review was also dismissed; the convict had no other avenue other than Supreme Court where he may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj (supra). “It is almost impossible to conceive that the remedy under Article 32 would be foreclosed to the petitioner when Article 21 is the only thing that stands between the petitioner and the rope of death, only in order to underscore and emphasize the finality of a judicial determination, which in all cases apart from such exceptional circumstances, is a cardinal principle to be abided by”. 

“Article 32 has pride of place – a Jewel on the Crown of the Justice Delivery System – in the Indian Constitutional scheme and is unquestionably available to even those who are serving sentences for the most heinous offences”. 

Therefore, Karol, J., held the present petition to be maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution given that Manoj (supra) was not in operation at the time when the convict was sentenced to death and his review was dismissed, and no other recognized way was available to him to approach the Court seeking benefit thereof.

Decision

The Court clarified that the finding of guilt recorded against the convict is left untouched and its intervention is strictly confined to the issue of sentence. Hence, the convict’s death sentence affirmed by Supreme Court on 3-5-2017 was set aside for the time being, and the matter was remitted for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in conformity with the directions in Manoj (supra). The Registry was directed to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for assignment to an appropriate Bench.


[Vasant Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1823, decided on 25-8-2025]

*Judgment by Justice Vikram Nath

**Concurring opinion by Justice Sanjay Karol

Advocates who appeared in this case: For Petitioner(s): Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv. Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini, AOR Mr. Shourya Dasgupta, Adv. Ms. Trisha Chandran, Adv. Mr. Pradyut Kashyap, Adv. Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Adv. Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Adv. Mr. Syed Faraz Alam, Adv. Mr. Atharva Gaur, Adv. Mr. Aayushman Aggarwal, Adv.

For Respondent(s): Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv. Mr. Adarsh Dubey, Adv. Mr. K.M.Nataraj, A.S.G. Mr. Vatsal Joshi, Adv. Mr. Sanjay Kr.tyagi, Adv. Mr. Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Adv. Ms. Agrmaa Singh, Adv. Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv. Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR


Thursday, August 21, 2025

India needs an ‘innocence movement’ to address miscarriages of justice


The Bombay High Court’s ruling in the 7/11 train blasts case is a clarion call to reform investigation and prosecution.

Aug 21, 2025 · 06:30 am

Asif Khan, one of the 12 men convicted for causing the 2006 Mumbai train blasts, was acquitted 19 years later. | Punit Paranjpe/ AFP

On July 21, the Bombay High Court acquitted 12 Muslim men of terror charges in the 2006 Mumbai train blasts case. Five of them were on death row and one had died in jail. These men had been arrested soon after the explosions in Mumbai local trains killed at least 180 people. The judgement represents a broader phenomenon where people accused in terror cases spend long years in prison before a court finally concludes that there was no real evidence connecting them to the alleged crime. From 2014 to 2022, according to the National Crime Records Bureau, 8,719 cases were registered under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, but there were only 222 convictions – a rate of around 2.5%. It is also unclear how many of these convictions will ultimately be overturned following stricter scrutiny by the appellate courts, just like in the train blasts case.

Some have criticised the Bombay High Court judgement, contending that criminal procedure should not come in the way of national security. But a scrutiny of the judgement shows that it was not merely the outcome of sticking to legal formalities but based on an analysis of substantial problems with the investigation and prosecution in this case. One of the main grounds for the trial court to convict the 12 men was their confessional statements. But when he Bombay High Court examined the circumstances in which these confessions were made, it found that even basic requirements of criminal procedure and evidence law were not followed. The confession should have been in a language the accused could understand and read back to them. In addition, they should have been informed of their right to consult a lawyer.

The High Court also took a detailed look at the allegations of torture made by the accused during the investigation that had not been properly scrutinised at the time. It concluded that the confessions had been extracted by subjecting the men to torture and so were not admissible. The court also pointed to glaring flaws in how the investigation and prosecution was conducted, such as deliberately suppressing Call Detail Records that could have exonerated the accused at the investigation stage itself.

All of this leads to the very real possibility that the entire case against the 12 men was false or fabricated. The disturbing pattern of Muslim men booked under terror charges being acquitted after spending years in prison has been well documented. In 2012, the Jamia Teachers’ Solidarity Association documented 16 cases in Delhi in which men booked for terror offences were acquitted due to the absence of evidence. The Innocence Network India, an initiative by one of the men exonerated in the Mumbai train blasts case, has also documented similar cases.

Both these reports have been cited by the Law Commission in its 277th Report, which recommended that a law be enacted to redress miscarriages of justice. The Law Commission report said that one of the “gravest instances” of the miscarriage of justice was a terror prosecution that resulted in an acquittal after 23 years: Mohammad Nissarudin had been arrested in 1994 and charged in the 1993 Rajdhani train blast case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, among other charges. The report envisages a Special Court being set up to determine claims of compensation for wrongful prosecution. It also strongly recommends recognising “wrongful prosecution” as a standard for identifying cases of the miscarriage of justice in India (in contrast to wrongful conviction or wrongful incarceration), This would include police or prosecutorial misconduct resulting in malicious or negligent investigation or prosecution.

Recent judgements, such as by the Supreme Court in the case of Kattavellai vs The State Of Tamil Nadu, as well as the Allahabad and Kerala High Courts, have sought to have the Law Commission report’s recommendations implemented. Article 14(6) of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights obligates India to enact a legislation to redress miscarriages of justice. In India, compensation has been recognised as both a private and public law remedy. In the case of public remedies, in cases of fundamental rights being violated, the High Courts and the Supreme Court have, through several judgements, read down the principle of sovereign immunity that would have protected the nation from being held legally liable. Courts have awarded compensation in cases of illegal detention and police misconduct. However, Indian courts have been reluctant to order compensation in cases involving alleged threats to national security. In 2016, when six Muslim men acquitted in the Akshardham blast case in Delhi approached the Supreme Court seeking compensation for their wrongful arrest, the court orally observed that entertaining such a petition would set a “dangerous precedent”.

The Supreme Court, in its order acquitting the accused, had pointed to several lapses in the investigation, including clear instances of the police fabricating evidence. Despite these observations, the spectre of national security superseded constitutional propriety. In stark contrast to this, two years later, the Supreme Court awarded Rs 50 lakh in compensation to Indian Space Research Organisation scientist Nambi Narayanan, who had been booked under the Official Secrets Act, among other offences. He was discharged when the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a closure report in the case.

Narayanan was awarded compensation by the High Court of Kerala, the Supreme Court and the National Human Rights Commission. Adherence to procedure or the lack thereof during investigation and prosecution are crucial determinants of the fairness of a trial. Human rights advocate KG Kannabiran pointed out that the “defence of a citizen as a person has always been procedure”. Procedural safeguards, such as magisterial oversight in the recording of self-incriminating statements or medical checkups while in police custody, potentially counter factors such as prejudice from impairing the integrity of a criminal trial.

As a consequence, the Bombay High Court’s findings on the procedural lapses in the train blasts investigation and the reasoning are critical to understanding the prosecution case itself. When these findings are read with the findings of courts in other terror cases, it reveals the faultlines of a criminal justice system that has long been overshadowed by similar stories of people incarcerated solely due to their identity or political ideology.


As is evident from the high rate of acquittals under terror laws, these cases collapse once the prosecution’s narrative is tested on the anvil of evidence and legal procedure.

Source: https://scroll.in/article/1085485/india-needs-an-innocence-movement-to-address-the-miscarriage-of-justice

Assam Man Sentenced To Death For Killing Woman Who Refused To Marry Him

Press Trust of India
Aug 21, 2025 21:01 pm IST


The woman, Nandita Saikia, suffered grievous injuries, and she was shifted to a hospital in Dibrugarh, where she died five days later.

Dhemaji: A local court in Assam on Thursday sentenced a man (Rintu Sharma) to death for murdering a woman exactly four years ago for refusing his marriage proposal, officials said. Dhemaji District and Sessions Court Judge Ajay Faglu passed the sentence after the accused was convicted in the case on Wednesday.

Nadita Saikia (L); Rintu Sharma alias Renu or Vintu Sharma (R)

The woman, Nandita Saikia, was returning home from college with a friend and her father on August 21, 2021, when Rintu Sarma, a fourth-grade worker in the same college, attacked all three and seriously injured them. Nandita was stabbed several times with a machete, and they were admitted to a hospital here, officials said. Her injuries were grievous, and she was shifted to a hospital in Dibrugarh, where she died five days later.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Source: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/man-sentenced-to-death-for-killing-woman-who-rejected-his-marriage-proposal-9131594

Tuesday, August 19, 2025

Kerala Death Row Convict Sentenced For 2023 Minor’s Murder Assaulted By Co-Prisoner At Thrissur Jail

Alam was stabbed using a spoon and assaulted by a co-prisoner, Rahilal, in the corridor in front of the fourth cell in the D-Block of Viyyur Central Jail at around 4 pm on Sunday. 

By : PTI | Updated at : 19 Aug 2025 02:07 PM (IST)

A Bihari man facing a death sentence for raping and murdering a minor girl at Aluva in 2023 was assaulted by a co-prisoner at the Viyyur Central Jail in Thrissur, police said here on Tuesday. Viyyur police have registered a case and started an investigation into the incident, they said.

The case was registered based on the complaint of Ashafaq Alam, 30, who was sentenced to death by Ernakulam Additional Sessions Court in November 2023. According to police officials, Alam was stabbed using a spoon and assaulted by a co-prisoner, Rahilal, in the corridor in front of the fourth cell in the D-Block of Viyyur Central Jail at around 4 pm on Sunday.

Ashafaq Alam (R)

Rahilal, hailing from Kottayam who was imprisoned in another criminal case, intercepted Alam and told him, "You are an accused in a murder case," the FIR stated. Later, he took out a spoon and stabbed Alam on his head and face, it said. Then, he continued to abuse Alam verbally. Soon, jail officials reached the place and provided medical aid to Alam.

Rahilal was shifted to a cell in another block to avoid any future confrontation. Based on the complaint of Alam, Viyyur police registered a case under sections 118(1) (voluntarily causing hurt using dangerous weapons and means) and 296(b) (obscene act) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). It was on July 28, 2023, Alam abducted a five-year-old daughter of a Bihar native couple and took her to a place where garbage was dumped behind Aluva market. There, he raped the victim and smothered her to death.

The police, who started a probe into the child missing incident, arrested Alam from Aluva and recovered the body of the victim. A police probe revealed that Alam also made sexual advances to a minor while he was staying in New Delhi. 

PTI TBA TGB KH

(This report has been published as part of the auto-generated syndicate wire feed. Apart from the headline, no editing has been done in the copy by ABP Live.)

Source: https://news.abplive.com/news/india/kerala-death-row-convict-sentenced-for-2023-murder-assaulted-by-co-prisoner-at-thrissur-jail-1795434

Friday, August 15, 2025

Telangana - Nalgonda Court Awards Death Penalty In 2013 Rape and Murder Case


Published : August 15, 2025 at 2:34 PM IST

Nalgonda: The Nalgonda Special Protection of Children From Sexual Offences (POSCO) Court in Telangana on Thursday sentenced Mohammed Mukharam to death for the rape and murder of an 11-year-old girl in 2013. The ruling was pronounced by Judge Rojaramani.

According to the prosecution, the incident took place on April 28, 2013, in Haiderkhanguda, Nalgonda district headquarters. Mohammed Mukharam, a local resident, lured the girl to his house under the pretext of giving her money to buy items from a grocery store.

When the child came, Mukharam raped her, subsequently strangled her to death, and dumped her body in a nearby water hole. After carrying out the crime, the accused fled from the spot. Following a thorough investigation, the Nalgonda police apprehended Mukharam and filed a chargesheet in the court. After a detailed trial, the court found the accused guilty on charges of rape and murder.

Judge Rojaramani sentenced Mukharam to two death penalties, one for each offence and imposed a fine of Rs. 1.10 lakh. Additionally, the court directed the government to provide Rs. 10 lakh as compensation to the victim’s family. Public Prosecutor Vemula Ranjithkumar represented the case for the prosecution, presenting compelling evidence that led to the conviction.

The death sentence is given by the courts, usually in the rarest of rare cases.

Source: https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!state/nalgonda-court-awards-death-penalty-in-2013-rape-and-murder-case-enn25081503244

Thursday, August 7, 2025

"Judges Should Never Be Bloodthirsty": Calcutta High Court Commutes Death Penalty To Life Term



Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya said that the evolution of society has been towards a reformative approach towards penology, as opposed to a retributive approach.

Press Trust of India
Aug 07, 2025 14:18 pm IST

Kolkata: Observing that judges should never be "bloodthirsty", the Jalpaiguri Circuit Bench of the Calcutta High Court has ordered the death sentence of a man be commuted to life imprisonment for the murder of his maternal uncle. Passing the judgment, Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya said that the evolution of society has been towards a reformative approach towards penology, as opposed to a retributive approach.

Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

"There are three cardinal pillars of punishment -- retribution, deterrence and reformation. Whereas deterrence still holds good as a justification, retribution has gradually given way to the reformatory aspect of penalties in modern criminal jurisprudence, both in India and elsewhere," the court said. Justice Bhattacharyya commuted the death sentence awarded to Aftab Alam by the Jalpaiguri sessions court for committing offence under Section 396 (dacoity with murder) to life sentence for the rest of his life, without any option of premature release for 20 years, unless exceptional circumstances are made out to the satisfaction of the court concerned.

"Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good for them," Justice Bhattacharyya observed.

Upholding the conviction of Alam by the trial court for the murder of his maternal uncle at Dhupguri in Jalpaiguri district on July 28, 2023, while committing dacoity at his house along with five other associates, Justice Bhattacharyya, while passing the judgment earlier this week, said that the crime does not fall under the 'rarest of the rare' category. Noting that in a landmark judgment in 1980 by the Supreme Court in the Bachan Singh versus State of Punjab case, a word of caution was put in, to the effect that "judges should never be bloodthirsty".

"The alteration of the names of jails from 'prisons' to 'correctional homes' in recent times is for a reason, reflecting the transition from the basic bloodthirsty instinct of society to take revenge to a more civilised policy of attempting to reform the accused, on the principle that one should hate the offence and not the offender," Justice Bhattacharyya observed. He said that there has been a debate around the world as to the retention of the death sentence as a punishment, however heinous and grave the offence may be.

"The anti-death penalty camp argues that if deterrence is taken to be a reason for punishment, a lifetime of imprisonment is as good as a death sentence. Rather, a lifetime behind bars, which denudes the convict of his freedom for his entire life, is a preferable form to punish him than death, which takes place in a flash," he noted. Justice Bhattacharyya observed that, pitting the pros and cons against each other, if a person is hanged or otherwise killed by dint of a death penalty, the damage done is irreversible.

He said that even if subsequently some new light is shed on the investigation or there is discovery of some new evidence or something to justify the reopening of the investigation, "there would be no chance of bringing back a life which has already been taken; thus, the death penalty is irreversible." Alam's lawyer argued that there was no evidence to show that the murder was pre-planned or cold-blooded or to conclude that the same fell under the category of "rarest of the rare" cases and that the trial judge did not consider the possibility of reformation at all. The additional public prosecutor, appearing for the state, contended that the crime was established beyond doubt and prayed that the capital punishment awarded to the appellant by the trial court be upheld.

Holding that the court finds no evidence adduced by the state that the convict is beyond reform, Justice Bhattacharyya said that the young age of Alam, who is in his twenties, is another mitigating factor which precludes awarding the death sentence. Noting that Alam was residing at Delhi for a long time after leaving his maternal uncle's house at Dhupguri, where he had earlier stayed for some years, the high court said that the "position of trust" approach cannot be applied, since at the time of the offence, the appellant was long gone from the shelter of his uncle. It noted that the "betrayal" angle, per se, does not justify the death penalty.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Source: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/judges-should-never-be-bloodthirsty-high-court-commutes-death-penalty-to-life-term-9037910

Tuesday, August 5, 2025

Calcutta HC commutes death sentence in 2023 Dhupguri murder case



By Soumyadip Mullick

5 Aug 2025 7:17 PM

Kolkata: The Calcutta High Court’s Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri has commuted the death sentence awarded to one Aftab Alam, who was convicted for murdering his uncle during a violent dacoity at the latter’s house in Dhupguri in July 2023. The division bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Uday Kumar upheld Alam’s conviction but substituted the capital punishment with life imprisonment. According to the prosecution, the incident took place around 1 am on July 28, 2023, when Alam and five co-accused entered victim Mehtab’s residence. While Mehtab was sleeping with his two sons in one room, his wife Moumita was asleep in an adjacent room.

Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

The assailants stabbed Moumita multiple times before moving to the next room and killing Mehtab. Moumita survived by feigning death and later alerted neighbours, who took her to Dhupguri Rural Hospital. The accused were apprehended shortly thereafter near Deomali. Alam was the only adult among the accused and was tried separately. The trial court sentenced him to death in September 2024, citing the brutal nature of the crime and what it described as a betrayal of trust. The court noted that Aftab, being the nephew of the deceased, had been given shelter by Mehtab following the early death of his father and was raised in the household for several years.

While upholding the conviction under Sections 396, 397 and 398 of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court found that the prosecution had established the chain of events through consistent eyewitness testimony, including that of Moumita and her two sons. The court ruled that minor discrepancies in witness statements did not undermine the prosecution’s case. However, in reviewing the sentence, the High Court observed that the trial court had not adequately considered the possibility of reformation. It held that awarding the death penalty in this case did not meet the threshold of the “rarest of rare” category. The bench noted that the appellant had no prior criminal record and had long ceased to reside with the victim’s family. The court directed that Aftab Alam be imprisoned for life for the offence of dacoity with murder, along with seven years of rigorous imprisonment under two additional charges, to run concurrently. A monetary fine was also imposed.

Source:

Saturday, August 2, 2025

Man who killed family over wife’s alleged infidelity spared death penalty; to remain in prison until natural death: Supreme Court

2 August 2025

Supreme Court: In the present case, the appellant-convict suspected infidelity of his wife and that his three children were not his own, brutally assaulted them, which resulted in their death. The 3-Judges Bench of Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol*, and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., while affirming the findings of the Courts below regarding the appellant’s conviction for the barbaric and ruthless murders of his family members, opined that the High Court, despite having considerable information, did not consider it appropriately and sufficiently, in relation to the findings of report that detailed the appellant’s social and psychological backdrop. The Court, after considering the total circumstances that drove the appellant to the point of committing the crime of a most reprehensible nature, opined that death penalty might not be appropriate and thus, party allowed the appeals to the extent that he was released from death row, and held that he should await his last breath in prison, without remission. 

Justice Sanjay Karol

Background 

In 2017, the appellant brutally assaulted his wife, his sister-in-law, and his children brutally, resulting in their death. Thereafter, he stepped out of the house and proclaimed his satisfaction of having put an end to the life of his wife and sister-in-law who, as per him, were engaged in ‘immoral activities’ and the children born to his wife, were a direct consequence of such immoral activities. There were eight prosecution witnesses, who heard the statement, rushed to the appellant’s house, and found his wife, his sister-in-law, and his children lying in a pool of blood. One of the appellant’s children who was still alive, was taken to the hospital, but she died there. One of the relatives of the appellant’s wife lodged a complaint with the police that the appellant killed his wife, his sister-in-law and even his children, and thereafter, the appellant himself went to the police and admitted having killed them. After completion of the investigation, challan was presented for trial under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court held that the appellant had barbarically murdered his family members, had a ‘beast mind’ and thus, found it fit to impose capital punishment. The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, but the same was confirmed by the High Court, against which the present appeal was filed. 

Analysis, Law, and Decision 

The Court stated that it could not be questioned that the appellant’s act came from a place of grave hatred for the deceased persons and noted that there was no sudden provocation which led him to take such a drastic step. The Court stated that his planning and forethought was exhibited by the fact that he sent away the only child he considered to be his own and had asked someone to collect her from the bus station, showing that he had love and care for her. The Court opined that the appellant’s doubt upon the paternity of his three children was not substantiated by any evidence or by any witness, thus, only on a hunch and as a matter of belief, he ended the lives of his three children. The Court stated that regarding the appellant’s sister-in-law, it was said that she aided and abetted the alleged misdeed and wrongdoings of the appellant’s wife. The Court stated that though the appellant was illiterate, he was not irrational, as he had a plan in mind which he executed, thereby achieving his goal. The Court opined that there was nothing on record which would discredit the prosecution’s case or expose any gaps, errors, conjectures, or surmises in the chain of circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt. No oral or documentary evidence was produced to show the appellant’s innocence and bring the possibility of involvement of third party. The Court opined that the High Court called for the report that detailed the appellant’s social and psychological backdrop, but they were not fully considered. The Probation Report revealed that the appellant had no antecedents; there was mixed opinion on whether he was suitable for reformation or not. 

The “Conduct and Behavioural Report” submitted by the Government of Karnataka, Prisons and Correctional Services recorded that he had “good moral character” and “good conduct” with co-prisoners and prison officials. He also attempted to mend one of the gaps in his life i.e., literacy, by participating in the Basic Literacy Program organized by the Zilla Lok Shiksha Samiti and passing the same with good rank. The Court noted that the mitigation report revealed difficulties throughout, like lack of paternal/maternal love and care which later became extreme protectiveness after the death of his brother, difficulties in learning in school leading to him dropping out, making impulsive decisions in business often leading to losses, breakdown of the marriage with his first wife. The Court also noted that the appellant made an attempt to take his own life on two occasions, one when he found out about the deaths of his entire family and two, when he himself was sentenced to death. The Court noted that the report had concluded that the appellant had the ability to adapt, engage in constructive activities, pursue an education despite past difficulty, continued worry about his daughter’s future, which showed a notable capacity for reform and personal growth. 

The Court relied on Ramesh A. Naika v. Registrar General, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 575, wherein the following factors were considered to modify the sentence of death to that of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, (a) lack of criminal antecedents; (b) satisfactory conduct in prison; and (c) possibility of reformation. The Court, in respect to the last factor, noted that there was mixed opinion on whether the appellant should or should not be able to reform his way, and thus opined that when there were two possible interpretations of a given set of facts or circumstances, the one that favoured the accused was to be adopted by the Court. The Court while affirming the findings of the Courts below regarding the appellant’s conviction for the barbaric and ruthless murders of his family members, opined that the High Court, despite having considerable information, did not consider it appropriately and sufficiently, in relation to the findings of reports. The Court, after considering the total circumstances that drove the appellant to the point of committing the crime of a most reprehensible nature, opined that the death penalty might not be appropriate. The Court opined that the appellant should spend his days in jail attempting to repent for the crimes committed by him and thus, party allowed the appeals to the extent that he was released from death row, and he should await his last breath in prison, without remission. 

[Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1455, decided on 16-7-2025] 

*Judgment authored by: Justice Sanjay Karol 

Advocates who appeared in this case : For the Appellant: Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Adv.; Aathma Sudhir Kumar, Adv.; Shreya Rastogi, Adv.; Vishal Sinha, Adv.; Trisha Chandran, Adv.; Aakarsh Kamra, AOR 

For the Respondent: Avishkar Singhvi, Additional Advocate General; V.N. Raghupathy, AOR...

Source: